We study the tit-for-tat dynamic in production markets, where each player can make a good given as input various amounts of goods in the system. In the tit-for-tat dynamic, each player allocates its good to its neighbors in fractions proportional to how much they contributed in its production in the last round. Tit-for-tat does not use money and was studied before in pure exchange settings [WZ07].
Introduction
The tit-for-tat strategy has been studied extensively in repeated games, where two agents playing tit-for-tat adjust their behavior to match that of their opponent in the past. For example, in the repeated Prisoner's dilemma, the choice of a player is between cooperation and retaliation. An agent playing tit-for-tat will cooperate as long as the their opponent cooperates as well, and will subsequently copy the previous action of the other agent. More generally, a tit-fortat strategy prescribes proportional retaliation to avoid escalation of conflict. Axelrod [Axe06] studies tit-for-tat to explain how high levels of cooperation can be achieved in groups of animals and human societies even when each individual player is selfish. Tit-for-tat can also be used to study economic policies such as setting tariffs between countries, where an increase in tariffs by one country is followed by corresponding increases in tariffs by other countries. Figure 1 : Tit-for-tat in two markets with n = 50 players. Each player i starts with an initial amount x i (0) of good i and a way of distributing its good given by a vector y i (0), where y i,j (0) is the fraction player i gives to player j (from good i) at round 0. The players repeatedly exchange goods, produce their good from the bundles acquired, and then update the fractions according to the tit-for-tat rule. The picture shows the fractions y j,i (t), which have large oscillations.
In production economies there is a set of n players, each of which starts with some amount of an eponymous good and a production recipe. The players can produce their own good given as input a bundle of various amounts of goods from the market. In the simple case of additive production, there is a matrix a so that player i can make a i,j units of its good given as input one unit of good j. The production economy model was studied first by Von Neumann [vN46] and Gale [Gal76] at the steady state, where the economy expands by the same factor as time progresses. Local dynamics in this type of market were recently studied in [BMN18] , where the players are starting with some arbitrary way of investing in goods and repeatedly adapting their investments based on past performance.
Contribution. Our contribution is to study the tit-for-tat dynamic in production markets with additive production, where the worth of a good is the same to everyone; that is, the input of player j has value a i,j = v j for any player i. In tit-for-tat, each player decides in what fractions to split its good among its neighbours, and then updates the fractions in the next round proportionally to the contribution of each good in its production. Examples from the simulation of economies for two and three players are given in Figure 2 and Figure 3 . , where y j,i (t) is the fraction received by player i from good j at time t. The players repeatedly exchange goods, produce from the bundles acquired, and then update the fractions according to the tit-for-tat rule. Note the fractions y j,i (t) in subfigure (a) have large oscillations initially.
We study the phase transitions and give an exact characterization of which players grow or vanish over time. In particular, if v * is the maximum value of any good in the economy, then the amounts of all the players i with v i > 1/v * grow in the limit. On the other hand, the players i with v i < 1/v * have vanishing amounts in the limit. If v i = 1/v * then the amount of player i stays in a bounded region throughout time. We also study how the fractions of their investments evolve in the long term, showing that in the limit the players invest their good only on the players with optimal production capacity.
Related Work
Tit-for-tat. The tit-for-tat dynamic was studied before in pure exchange markets (without production) by Wu and Zhang [WZ07] , where there is a set of players, such that each player i owns one unit of good i. The players have additive valuations given by a matrix a, where a i,j is the value of player i for a unit of good j. Each player repeatedly brings to the market one unit of a good in order to exchange it for other goods that are potentially more valuable. In tit-for-tat each player decides in what fractions to split its good among its neighbours, and then updates the fractions in the next round proportionally to the utility received from each neighbour. The main result in [WZ07] is that when the valuations are symmetric 1 the dynamic converges to market equilibria for all non-degenerate starting configurations. The work in [BDR19] further showed the tit-for-tat dynamic cycles in exchange economies with non-symmetric valuations.
Proportional response. A related dynamic studied in markets is proportional response, in which every player starts with some amount of good and an initial budget of money that it can use for acquiring goods. In each round, the players split their budget into bids on the goods, then each good is allocated to each player in proportion to the bid amount and the seller collects the money made from selling. In the exchange economy, each player updates their bids on the goods in proportion to the contribution of each good in their utility; there, the dynamic converges to market equilibria [BDR19] for any economy with additive valuations. In Fisher markets, proportional response converges to market equilibria, which was shown for additive valuations in [Zha11] and for all CES valuations by [CCT18] . In Fisher markets with additive valuations, the proportional response dynamic is equivalent to gradient descent [BDX11] .
In production markets with additive production, the proportional response dynamic was shown in [BMN18] to lead to universal growth of the market, where the amount of goods produced grows over time (whenever growth is possible), but also to growing inequality between the players on the most efficient production cycle and the rest. In particular, the dynamic learns through local interactions a global feature of the exchange graph-the cycle with the highest geometric mean.
Tatonement. Another central dynamic studied in markets is tatonement, which has been studied in a series of papers on markets for players with additive, CES (constant elasticity of substitution), and Leontief valuations [CCT18, CCD19, CF08]. Tatonement does not prescribe how allocations may be formed, but defines how prices are adapted depending on the demand in the previous round. The Shapley-Shubik game [SS77] , which forms the basis of the proportional response dynamic, was studied in static Fisher and exchange settings for its equilibrium qualities [JT04, FLZ05, BGM17].
Model
There is a set N = {1, . . . , n} of players, so that each player i can make good i using as ingredients various amounts of goods in the system. The production recipe is given by a vector v, so that player i can make v j units of its good given one unit of good j 2 .
The tit-for-tat dynamic is defined next. Note that there is no money involved; instead, each player decides how to allocate its good among the players in the economy, and then updates its fractions depending on what it received from the other players.
Definition 1 (Tit-for-tat Dynamic). Each good i is worth v i to every player j. The initial amount of good i is x i (0). Each player i starts by allocating its good in initial fractions y i (0). At each time t, the following steps take place:
• Exchange. Every player i receives an amount w i,j (t) = y j,i (t)·x j (t) of each good j, where y j,i (t) is the fraction given by player j to player i (from good j) in round t.
• Production. Each player i produces its good from the bundle acquired:
• Fractions update. Each player i updates the fraction it gives to player j according to the contribution of good j in its production:
The starting configuration is non-degenerate: x i (0) > 0 and y j,i (0) > 0 for all i, j. Recall y j,i (t) is the fraction received by player i from good j at time t; each color represents one trajectory of y j,i (t) for some pair (i, j). Note some trajectories have very large fluctuations before converging and so appear as a region.
Long Term Behavior
We characterize the rate of growth for each player as follows.
Theorem 1. Consider an economy with n players following the tit-for-tat dynamic. Recall v * = max j∈[n] v j . Then for each player i there exist constants c i , d i > 0 so that the amount of good i satisfies
In particular, the amount of good i grows over time if v i > 1/v * , vanishes if v i < 1/v * , and stays in a bounded region throughout time
Proof. From the update rule in Definition 1, it follows that for each pair of players (i, j) we have y i,j (t + 1)
Multiplying the two identities in (1) gives
We consider two cases. If t = 2 + 1, then from (2) we get t =1 y i,j (2 + 1)
Rewriting (3) we obtain
Let i * be a player with maximum value good: v i * = v * . Recall y i,j (t) ≤ 1 for all i, j. By taking j = i * in equation (4) we get
Thus there is a constant c i > 0 so that
To upper bound the amount of good i, recall that n j=1 y i,j (t) = 1. By summing over all j in equation (4) we get:
By taking d i = x i (1) > 0, we get x i (2 + 1) ≤ d i · (v i · v * ) for each . Together with (6), this implies that for each player i there exist constants c i , d i > 0 so that
If t = 2 , then the identity in (2) gives
By combining the cases of even and odd t it follows that there exist c i , d i > 0 so that
This gives the required long term behavior for the sequence x i (t).
Remark 1. Every player with a valuable good grows in the limit. This follows from Theorem 1. It can also be shown directly by considering the potential function g i (t) = x i (t) · y i,i (t) for each player i and noting that g i (t) = v t i · g i (0). Then x i (t) = v t i · g i (0)/y i,i (t), and so for v i > 1 we get lim t→∞ x i (t) = ∞.
Note, however, that players may grow even if their production coefficient is less than one as long as it is above a minimum threshold. Thus the dynamic supports some diversity in the set of players that survive in the long run. Figure 5 : Fractions y j,i (t), for all i, j, in two economies with n = 100 players over 50 rounds (a) and 300 rounds (b). Recall y j,i (t) is the fraction received by player i from good j at time t. Note the fractions have large oscillations.
We also show that in the limit, each player sends its good only to those players with optimal production. Corollary 1. Let i be any player and j any player with sub-optimal production, i.e. with v j < v * . Then player i gives a fraction of 0% of its good to player j in the limit: lim t→∞ y i,j (t) = 0.
Proof. Using identity (4) and inequality (10) in Theorem 1, for each player i we get y i,j (2 + 1) = (v i · v j ) ·
x i (1) · y i,j (1) x i (2 + 1)
For any j with v j < v * , taking the limit of → ∞ in (11) gives lim →∞ y i,j (2 + 1) = 0. We can similarly use (9) and inequality (10) in Theorem 1 to show that y i,j (2 ) =
x i (0)·y i,j (0) d i · v j v * , which gives lim →∞ y i,j (2 ) = 0. Thus lim t→∞ y i,j (t) = 0.
Note that even though all the fractions y i,j (t) eventually converge to 0 or 1, in the examples shown there are large fluctuations in the initial periods.
